
Privacy and Data Protection for Drivers

A Contribution from the EVITA project

*Dr. Timo Kosch
BMW Group Research and Technology
Hanauerstr. 46
80992 München, Germany*




Project partners




Project Motivation: Use Cases




Car2TrafficInfrastructure




Car2Car




Car2NearField




Car2Home



Car2MobileDevice



Car2Enterprise



Car2CustomerPortal

Threats


- **Simulation**

- Simulation of 400 honest/good vehicles
- Variable number of attackers randomly put in scenario



- **Results**

- 3 attackers have hit already
≈ 20% honest/good vehicles
- 10 attackers are able to interfere
≈ 50% of honest/good vehicles



Project Scope: Focus on in-vehicle systems

- The attacks on *external* communication:



- must be prevented or
- at least be detected and contained,
- so that fake messages injected into the (wireless) communication infrastructure are properly identified and eliminated before influencing eSafety applications.

- Attacks on *in-vehicle* system infrastructure




- via physical access or
- via wireless interface
- must be prevented or
- at least be detected and contained,
- so that fake messages are properly identified and eliminated before influencing applications.

Project Scope: Focus on in-vehicle systems

- Targeting requirements of eSafety eSecurity WG and C2C-CC
- Research on a secure on-board architecture:
 - Safeguard future cooperative eSafety applications
 - Tampering with cars can cause impact on other cars
- Software is not secure enough for tomorrow's cooperative eSafety applications:
 - Looking for appropriate SW and HW measures for ensuring security
 - Finding a suitable solution using SW and HW security
 - Research on architecture (centralized vs. distributed)
 - Defining overall security architecture for cooperative vehicles
- Defining hardware co-processor:
 - Secure on-board and V2X communication
 - Secure storage and processing of secret material
 - Hardware security anchor
 - High throughput only possible with hardware acceleration




Project Scope: Complementary Security Activities



Project Objectives

- Modular, (cost-) efficient security for:
 - In-vehicular devices: sensors, actuators, ECUs with
 - HW and SW architecture securing SW applications based on the HW modules
- in order to:
 - enforce ECU software protection against SW attacks
 - plus optional selected HW attacks depending on the level of HW tamper protection
 - provide ECU HW/SW-configuration attestation (reliable proof of setup)
 - support/process ECU to ECU communication protection
 - support/process V2X communication and privacy protection
- based on:
 - hardware based security anchors
 - software security layer, mechanisms and API specification
 - that make use of HW security module BUT can also be built completely in SW

Project Structure



Key Results of the 1st year

WP1000 Liaison Activities

- CAST Workshop in Darmstadt 
- Working on Hardware Security strategy with HIS 
- Planned Liaison Workshop November 5th/ Wolfsburg



EVITA

WP2000 Security Requirement Engineering

- Use Cases:
 - Categorization into 6 fields
 - Detailed formal information flow
- Threat and Risk Analysis:
 - Threat identification based on attack trees
 - EVITA concept for risk assessment, based on
 - severity of an attack (based on ISO 26262)
 - probability of success (ISO/IEC 15408 & 18045)
- Security Requirements:
 - Formal and Semi-formal description


WP3000 Secure On-board Architecture Design and Verification

- First draft of Security and Trust Model:
 - Specification of a Meta-model for Trust and Security
 - Formal Security Refinement Process
- EVITA Architecture:
 - Design of a three-leveled HW architecture
 - Discussion on integration of EVITA library with AUTOSAR

WP4000 Security Architecture Implementation

- Defined and agreed on prototype hardware
- Defined and agreed on implementation tool chain

Basic Idea: EVITA Overall On-Board Architecture



General Structure of Hardware Security Module

- Main goal
 - Providing secure platform for cryptographic functionalities that support use cases


- Features
 - Secure Storage
 - HW Cryptographic Engines
 - Secure CPU Core
 - Scalable Security Architecture

- Advantages
 - Flexibility
 - Extendability
 - Migration Path from existing SW solutions


General Structure of Hardware Security Module

- **HSM physically separate from CPU**
 - Less secure than a single chip: connection between CPU and HSM not secure.
 - Suitable for short-term designs or low-security applications with very small production runs
 - Expensive: extra chip costs more due to the extra pins,
- **HSM in the same chip as the CPU but with a state machine**
 - More secure than external chip and more cost-effective
 - Not flexible: Hardware structure not modifiable. Automotive microcontroller life cycle is more than 20 years
 - Suitable for very high security applications with very short lifetimes
 - implementing asymmetric cryptography using this structure requires large (and inflexible) multi-precision arithmetic hardware.
 - Cryptographic applications will need to be implemented at the application CPU level: possible performance issues.
 - Changing a state machine requires hardware redesign and is very expensive
- **HSM in the same chip as the CPU but with a programmable secure core**
 - proposed solution
 - Secure and cost-effective
 - Flexible because of programmable core.
 - Usable for other industries

General Structure of Hardware Security Module



EVITA On-Board Architecture Deployment




Next Steps in Year 2

- Finalization of Security and Trust Model
- Finalization of EVITA Security Architecture
- EVITA Security Protocols
- Model based Verification
- Implementation

Thank you for your attention.



www.evita-project.org



Benjamin Weyl
Chair WG Security & Middleware



www.car-2-car.org

timo.kosch@bmw.de
benjamin.weyl@bmw.de

BMW Group
Research and Technology

